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Standing, Statutory Violations, and Concrete Injury in 
Federal Consumer Financial Protection Statutes After 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since 2011, lower-level employees at Wells Fargo have 
fraudulently opened more than two million depository and credit card 
accounts without consumers’ authorization.1 Cross-selling  quotas 
required to remain employed at Wells Fargo motivated these 
employees.2 Despite a settlement, Wells Fargo still faces legal action 
from consumers as well as employees who were fired for refusing to 
participate in the fraud.3 This fraud generated $2.6 million in additional 
fees that were charged to customers in connection with accounts they 
had never intended to open.4 It is difficult to know how these accounts 
impacted customers’ credit scores and how damaged credit scores 
impacted their financial well-being.5  Federal legislation like the Truth  
in Lending Act (“TILA”),6 the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),7 
and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”),8 (collectively, 
 
1. Dan Freed, Heat Rises on Wells Fargo CEO After Lawmaker Grilling, REUTERS 
(Sept. 21, 2016, 12:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/wells-fargo-accounts-ceo- 
idUSL2N1BX171. 
2. Laura J. Keller & Elizabeth Dexheimer, Wells Fargo CEO Takes Beating as 
Lawmakers Demand Accountability, 28 BANKR. L. REP. (BNA) No. 36. at 1176 (Sept. 22, 
2016). 
3. James Rufus Koren, Wells Fargo Settled Over its Bogus Accounts, but it Still Faces 
a Fight from Customers and Ex-Employees, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2016), http:// 
www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-lawsuits-20160909-snap-story.html. 
4. Freed, supra note 1. 
5. Keller & Dexheimer, supra note 2, at 1176. 
6. Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2015) (noting that, 
“economic stabilization would be enhanced and the competition among the various financial 
institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of consumer credit would be 
strengthened by the informed use of credit”). 
7. Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) § 602, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (2015) (“The 
banking system is dependent upon fair and accurate credit reporting.”). 
8. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) § 807, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2015) 
(“It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt 
collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection 
practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to 
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“federal consumer protection statutes”) exist to keep financial 
institutions, like Wells Fargo, from abusing their power at the expense 
of consumers.9 Consumers10 rely on the civil liability provisions  of 
federal consumer protection statutes to deter misbehavior by covered 
entities,11 as well as to recover against those entities when the behavior 
is not deterred.12 
FCRA and its civil penalty provision13 were at issue in a 2016 
Supreme Court opinion in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.14 FCRA imposes a 
duty upon covered entities to follow “reasonable procedures to assure 
maximum possible accuracy” of consumer information they report.15 
While Spokeo specifically addressed an issue in a lawsuit brought under 
FCRA, the decision’s impact stretches to other federal consumer 
protection statutes.16 To date, Spokeo has not been adjudicated on the 
merits.17 While the eventual result could be interesting,18 the relevant 
part of the proceedings for this Note is the treatment of Article III 
 
protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”). 
9. See, e.g., FCRA § 602, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (“The banking system is dependent 
upon fair and accurate credit reporting.”). 
10. See FCRA § 603, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c) (“The term ‘consumer’ means an 
individual.”). “Individual” excludes partnerships, corporations, trusts, estates, governments 
and other associations. See FCRA § 603, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b) (defining “person” as 
including consumers). 
11. See Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181, 185 (2012) 
(“To deny that judicial decisions provide a deterrent effect is to deny the historic role of the 
judiciary, not just as a matter of civil justice but as a primary and fundamental source of 
behavioral norms.”). 
12. See, e.g., FCRA § 616, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (“Any person who willfully fails to 
comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer  
is liable to that consumer . . . .”). 
13. Id. 
14.    Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
15.    FCRA § 607, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). 
16. See FDCPA § 813, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (“Except as otherwise provided by this 
section, any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with 
respect to any person is liable to such person . . . .”). This excerpt is the civil liability 
provision in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Since Spokeo is about Article III 
standing, it potentially impacts every federal statute that contains a civil liability provision 
for a bare statutory violation; Telephone Consumer Protection Act § 3(a), 47 U.S.C. § 
227(b)(1)(B) (2015) (“It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States, or any 
person outside the United States if the recipient is within the United States . . . to initiate  
any telephone call to any residential telephone line using  an  artificial  or  prerecorded  
voice . . . .”). 
17. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1550 (“[T]he case is remanded for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion”). 
18. See discussion infra Part V (suggesting that consumer class action lawsuits have a 
significant impact on the financial well-being of financial institutions). 
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standing19 in Spokeo.20 
This Note examines the Supreme Court’s opinion in Spokeo, 
critiques the Court’s treatment of Article III standing issues, considers 
Spokeo’s impact on financial institutions and consumers, and concludes 
by suggesting a new test for standing. This Note proceeds in seven 
parts. Part II reviews the general requirements for Article III21 standing 
as provided by Supreme Court precedent and explains how Article III 
standing differs for intangible harm in statutory violation cases.22 Part 
III explores the treatment of Spokeo’s standing issue in each level of the 
federal courts.23 Part IV argues that Justice Alito’s majority opinion in 
Spokeo poses more questions than it answers and suggests that Justice 
Alito incorrectly applied precedent, and, as a result, the majority and 
dissenting opinions fail to address the same issues.24 Part V discusses 
how Spokeo benefits both financial institutions and consumers.25 Part  
VI recommends a new test for Article III standing.26 Part VII concludes 
by summarizing the major takeaways from Spokeo.27 
 
II. ARTICLE III STANDING IN THE CONTEXT OF INTANGIBLE HARM 
 
To sue in federal court, a plaintiff must have standing, a 
requirement that emerges from the Constitution’s “cases and 
controversies” doctrine.28 The irreducible constitutional minimum of 
standing contains three elements: (1) injury in fact, (2) a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct, and (3)  redressability.29 
 
19. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 1 (limiting federal jurisdiction to cases and 
controversies). 
20. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1544 (“This case presents the question whether 
respondent Robins has standing to maintain an action in federal court . . . .”). 
21. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 1 (limiting federal jurisdiction to cases and 
controversies). 
22. See infra Part II. 
23. See infra Part III. 
24. See infra Part IV. 
25. See infra Part V. 
26. See infra Part VI. 
27. See infra Part VII. 
28. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 1 (limiting federal jurisdiction to cases and 
controversies); see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“Though 
some of its elements express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial self- 
government, the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case- 
or-controversy requirement of Article III.”). 
29.    Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
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Since the Court in Spokeo only took issue with injury in fact, the latter 
two elements will not be discussed further.30 
“Injury in fact” is defined as “an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or 
imminent.”31 Particularization means “it must affect the plaintiff in a 
personal and individual way.”32 Concreteness is a far  more  fleeting 
idea.33 In a sense, the injury must be “real.”34 In Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife,35 decided in 1992, Justice Scalia rejected a claim of standing 
where, in the Court’s view, Congress attempted to convert the public’s 
undifferentiated interest, meaning an interest not properly held by any 
single person, in the proper administration of law into an individual  
right by statute.36 However, even there, it seems that Scalia conflated 
particularization and concreteness.37  Scalia  seemed  more  concerned 
that violation of the statute creates an injury that is not personal or 
distinct in any meaningful way.38 
The Supreme Court attempted to distinguish concreteness and 
particularization in Federal Election Commission v. Akins in 1998.39 In 
Akins,  a  group  of  voters  filed  an  administrative  complaint  with the 
 
 
30. The second element requires that “the injury . . . be fairly traceable to the 
challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some  
third party not before the court.” Id. The third element is that “it must be likely as opposed  
to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. 
31. Id. The “actual or imminent” part of the “injury in fact” definition is not addressed 
by the Supreme Court. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (“We 
discuss the particularization and concreteness requirements below.”). Likewise, this Note 
does not address it. 
32. See id. (citing additional cases which use words like “personal” and “distinct” to 
describe particularization. 
33. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577–78 (using “concrete” as “real”). 
34. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (defining “concrete” as “real”). 
35.    504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) 
36. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576–77 (“The question presented here is whether the public 
interest in proper administration of the law . . . can be converted into an individual right by a 
statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens . . . to sue.”). 
37. See id. (writing about cases where generalized public grievances are alleged as 
individual harm). Throughout this section of the opinion, Scalia wrote about whether the 
rights at issue belonged to the public generally or to individuals. See id. This conversation 
sounded much more like it related to particularization. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548 
(noting that words like “personal” and “distinct” define particularization). 
38. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (noting that words like “personal” and distinct” 
define particularization). 
39. See Fed. Elec. Comm. v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998) (“The kind of judicial 
language to which the FEC points . . . invariably appears in cases where the harm at issue is 
not only widely shared, but is also of an abstract and indefinite nature . . . .”). 
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Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) asserting that the American 
Israel Public Affairs Committee (“AIPAC”) was required to register as   
a political committee.40 Once registered as a  political  committee,  a 
group must make certain public disclosures including statements about 
its membership and contributions.41 The FEC asserted that the  voters  
did not have standing to bring such a complaint because the harm was 
neither concrete nor particularized.42 The majority opinion described an 
abstract—in contradistinction from concrete—injury as one that 
effectively results in the Court issuing an advisory opinion.43 Rather  
than affirmatively defining concreteness, the Court said that an abstract 
injury is like harm to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed, 
essentially reiterating the notion that an undifferentiated public interest 
cannot give rise to concrete injury.44 However, just because an injury 
may be widely shared does not mean it lacks concreteness by necessity; 
where an injury is concrete, yet widely shared, courts have found  
“injury in fact.”45 In Akins, the Supreme Court found “injury in fact” 
where the plaintiffs were unable to access information to which a  
federal statute entitled them to have access.46 
Concreteness also does not require that the injury be tangible.47 
Courts look to Congress for guidance about what sorts of intangible 
harms can satisfy the minimum Article III  requirements.48  The  
Supreme Court acknowledged in Lujan that Congress can elevate to the 
status of legally cognizable concrete injuries those intangible injuries 
 
 
40.    Id. at 13–14. 
41. See id. at 13 (noting that the Federal Election Campaign Act requires public 
disclosures from political committees). 
42. See id. at 19 (“The Solicitor General argues that respondents lack standing . . . and 
that respondents have not shown that they ‘suffe[r] injury in fact.’”). 
43. See id. at 24 (“The abstract nature of the harm . . . prevents a plaintiff from 
obtaining what would, in effect, amount to an advisory opinion.”). 
44. See id. (The abstract nature of the harm—injury to the interest in seeing that the  
law is obeyed . . . “). 
45. See id. (“[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the court has found 
‘injury in fact.’”). 
46. See id. at 21 (“The ‘injury in fact’ that respondents have suffered consists of their 
inability to obtain information . . . that . . . the statute requires that AIPAC make public.”). 
47. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Although tangible injuries 
are perhaps easier to recognize, we have confirmed in many of our previous cases that 
intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.”) Justice Alito cites free speech and free 
exercise of religion cases as examples of intangible harms that meet the concreteness 
requirement. Id. 
48. Id. 
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which otherwise would be constitutionally inadequate.49 Congress 
created such a legally cognizable concrete injury in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1968.50 The Court’s opinion in Lujan implicitly asserts that a  
violation of a person’s interest in living in a racially integrated 
community would not usually meet the injury in fact standard.51 
However, Congress elevated the injury so that it satisfied the 
concreteness requirement through legislative means.52 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the injury required 
by Article III “may exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal 
rights, the invasion of which creates standing.’”53 The violation of a 
statutorily granted procedural right is sometimes sufficient and a 
plaintiff need not allege any additional harm.54 In Akins, the right to 
access information, a list of AIPAC donors for instance, was created by 
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.55 Congress elevated this 
right to the status of a right, “the invasion of which creates standing.”56 
In the particular context of “bare” statutory violations, cases like Akins 
and Lujan indicate that there is an alternate way to find standing in 
federal courts.57 
 
49. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (“Both of the cases 
used by Linda R.S. as an illustration of that principle involved Congress’ elevating to the 
status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously 
inadequate in law.”). 
50. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) (2015) (allowing an 
aggrieved person to file a complaint within one year of an alleged discriminatory housing 
practice); see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life. Ins. Co., 409 
U.S. 205, 208–12 (1972)). 
51. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (implying that injury to a person’s interest in living in a 
racially integrated community is the sort of injury that Congress needs to elevate in order for 
it to suffice for standing). 
52. Id. 
53.    Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578. 
54. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“[T]he violation of a 
procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute 
injury in fact. In other words, a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm 
beyond the one Congress has identified.”). 
55. See Fed. Elec. Comm. v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 13 (1998) (“[T]he American Israel 
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is not a ‘political committee’ as defined by the Federal 
Election Campaign Act . . . and . . . the FEC has refused to required AIPAC to make 
disclosures.”). 
56.    Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578. 
57. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 20 (“Given the language of the statute and the nature of the 
injury, we conclude that Congress, intending to protect voters such as respondents from 
suffering the kind of injury here at issue, intended to authorize this kind of suit.”); see also 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (noting that the injury required by Article III “may exist solely by 
virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.”). 
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III. DOES MR. ROBINS HAVE ARTICLE III STANDING TO SUE? 
 
The important legal question at issue in Spokeo was whether a 
bare statutory violation constituted a concrete injury sufficient to confer 
standing.58 The Supreme Court demanded a formal application of the 
three-element standing test: (1) Plaintiff must have suffered an “injury 
in fact” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent”; 
(2) there must be a causal relationship between the injury and the 
conduct; and (3) it must be more likely than not that the relief will 
redress the injury.59 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit suggested there is an 
alternative route to Article III standing when a statutory violation is 
involved: Congress can confer standing by elevating certain injuries to 
legally cognizable injuries, subject to two limitations.60 The plaintiff 
must allege her statutory rights, not that the defendant simply violated 
the statute, and the statutory right in question must protect against 
“individual, rather than collective, harm.”61 
Thomas Robins instituted a lawsuit in federal district court in 
California alleging that Spokeo, Inc. (“Spokeo”) operated its consumer 
reporting website in violation of the FCRA.62  FCRA  mandates  that 
credit reporting agencies “follow reasonable procedures to assure 
maximum possible accuracy” of consumer reports.63 FCRA also 
provides that “any person who willfully fails to comply with any 
requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to  any 
consumer is liable to that consumer” for actual damages or statutorily 
prescribed damages.64 Spokeo owns and operates a website that 
publishes information about consumers such as education, marital  
status,  and  information  about  the  individual’s  economic condition.65 
 
 
58. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 
1540 (2016) (“The violation of a statutory right is usually a sufficient injury in fact to confer 
standing.”). But see Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (“To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff 
must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is 
‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”). 
59.    Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
60. See Robins, 742 F.3d at 413 (“The court identified two constitutional limitations on 
congressional power to confer standing.”). 
61. Id. 
62. Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
63. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 607, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2015). 
64.    Id. § 1681n(a). 
65. Robins, 742 F.3d at 410. 
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Robins alleged that Spokeo maintained an inaccurate report about him 
on the website, thereby willfully violating the relevant provision of 
FCRA.66 Specifically, Robins alleged that the profile contained  a 
picture purporting to be him, which was not him.67 Robins also alleged 
that the profile wrongfully stated that he was in his fifties, married with 
children, and employed in a technical or professional field.68 While the 
website contained this misinformation, Robins claimed that he was “out 
of work,” looking for a job, single, and without children.69 Robins 
asserted that this misinformation caused actual harm to his employment 
prospects.70 
 
A. The Central District of California Found Robins Lacked 
Standing 
 
FCRA requires consumer reporting agencies to “follow 
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the 
information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.”71 
Robins alleged that Spokeo was in violation of this portion of the statute 
in maintaining its website with the inaccurate  information.72  The  
United States District Court for the Central District of California  
granted Spokeo’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing.73 The court  
held that Robins failed to allege any injury in fact caused by Spokeo.74 
The district court pointed out that “even when asserting a statutory 
violation, the plaintiff must allege ‘the Article III minima of injury-in- 
fact.’”75  In this case, Robins claimed that he had been “unsuccessful in 
 
 
66. Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Spokeo, Inc. 136 S. 
Ct. at 1546 (“Robins filed a class-action complaint . . . claiming . . . that Spokeo willfully 
failed to comply with the FCRA requirements enumerated above.”). 
67. Id. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
68. Id. Additionally, the profile claimed that his economic health was very good and 
that his income was in the top 10%.  Mr. Robins alleged that this is not true. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. In his brief, Robins suggests that “Spokeo’s report made him appear 
overqualified for jobs he might have gained, expectant of a higher salary than employers 
would be willing to pay, and less mobile because of family responsibilities.” Id. 
71. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 607, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2015). 
72. Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
73.  Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., No. CV10-05306 ODW, 2011 WL 597867, at *2 (C.D.  
Cal., Jan. 27, 2011), vacated, 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
74. Id. at *1. 
75. Id. 
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seeking employment.”76 Additionally, he alleged that he was concerned 
about future harms; he was concerned that the inaccurate reporting 
“[would] affect his ability to obtain credit [and/or] employment.”77 
Finding that Robins lacked standing, the court dismissed his case for 
want of subject matter jurisdiction and Robins appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit.78 
 
B. The Ninth Circuit Found Article III Standing 
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, upon wading 
into this complex legal doctrine regarding standing,79 reversed the ruling 
of the district court.80 The court held that “[w]hen . . . the statutory  
cause of action does not require proof of actual damages, a plaintiff can 
suffer a violation of the statutory right without suffering actual 
damages.”81 FCRA’s civil penalty provision attaches liability to a party 
who violates the statute without referencing any kind of harm to a 
victim.82  Regardless of whether any actual damages are claimed, there  
is an alternative clause for damages of a statutory variety.83  The  circuit 
 
76. Id. 
77. Id. It is possible that the district court is conflating injury in fact with the causation 
element of standing. See id. (“Plaintiff only expresses that he has been unsuccessful in 
seeking employment.”). If the inaccurate consumer information is causing Robins not to be 
able to obtain a job that he otherwise would be able to get, that seems like injury in fact. See 
id. (implicitly acknowledging that a present as opposed to future claim of harm to 
employment prospects would be sufficient injury in fact). So, although Robins is also 
worried about possible, continuing future harm, he does allege a present, rather than 
speculative injury. See id. (alleging that his job prospects are currently negatively impacted 
by Spokeo’s mistakes). 
78. Id. (“Because Plaintiff does not have standing to  bring  his  claims  before  this 
court . . . this case is hereby dismissed . . . .”); see Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 410 
(9th. Cir. 2014) (appealing on standing), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
79. Robins, 742 F.3d at 411. After the initial finding of no standing, Robins submitted 
an amended complaint. Id. The district court then decided that the amended complaint 
sufficiently plead injury in fact. Id. When Spokeo moved to certify an interlocutory appeal, 
the court reversed its order finding standing on the amended complaint. Id. This flip- 
flopping is evidence of the fleeting nature of the standing requirements, particularly injury  
in fact. 
80. See id. at 414 (holding that Mr. Robins adequately alleges Article III standing). 
81.    Id. at 411. 
82. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 616, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (2015) (“Any 
person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter 
with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of any 
actual damages . . . or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000.”). 
83. See id. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (“Any person who willfully fails to comply with any 
requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that 
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court then drew on Lujan,84 pointing out that Congress can elevate 
“concrete, de facto” injuries to legally cognizable injuries.85 The 
question becomes: are violations of statutory rights created by FCRA 
injuries that Congress can elevate?86 
Other circuits have weighed in on whether the violation of 
statutory rights under FCRA are intangible injuries that Congress can 
elevate to an injury in fact. The Sixth Circuit addressed whether FCRA 
statutory violations are injuries Congress can elevate in 200987 and the 
Seventh Circuit addressed it in 2006.88 In Beaudry v. TeleCheck 
Services, Inc.,89 the Sixth Circuit offered two constitutional limitations 
on congressional power to create standing: (1) a plaintiff must be 
“among the injured” and (2) “the statutory right . . . must protect against 
individual . . . harm.”90 In Beaudry, Cheryl Beaudry sued TeleCheck 
Services (“TeleCheck”), a corporation that provides check verification 
services, under the civil liability provision of the FCRA.91 Beaudry 
claimed that TeleCheck did not account for a change in Tennessee 
driver’s licenses, which resulted in the incorrect reporting that Beaudry 
was a first-time check writer.92 Over TeleCheck’s insistence that 
Beaudry needed to allege more injury than a plain statutory violation,93 
 
consumer in an amount equal to the sum of any actual damages . . . or damages of not less 
than $100 and not more than $1,000.”). 
84. See discussion infra Part II. 
85. Robins, 742 F.3d at 413. 
86. Id. 
87. See Beaudry v. TeleCheck Servs., Inc., 579 F.3d 702, 705–07 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that the FCRA allows for recovery when there are no measurable damages). 
88. Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 2006) (“That actual 
loss is small and hard to quantify is why statutes such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
provide for modest damages without proof of injury.”). 
89.   579 F.3d 702, 705–07 (6th Cir. 2009). 
90. Robins, 742 F.3d at 413 (citing Beaudry, 579 F.3d at 707). In Beaudry, the  
plaintiff, also under the FCRA, alleged that she was one of the people about whom the false 
reports were generated and thus met the first requirement. Beaudry, 579 F.3d at 704. “She 
thus has alleged that the defendants’ failure to follow ‘reasonable procedures to assure 
maximum possible accuracy’ of credit reporting information occurred ‘with respect to her’ 
as the statute requires.” Id. The Sixth Circuit then found that FCRA clears the second 
constitutional hurdle as well. FCRA “creates an individual right not to have unlawful 
practices occur ‘with respect to’ one’s own credit information. Id. 
91. Beaudry, 579 F.3d at 703; see Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) 
(2015) (“Any person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposes under this 
subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer . . . .”). 
92. See Beaudry, 579 F.3d at 703 (stating that TeleCheck failed to account for a change 
in the way Tennessee licenses are numbered). 
93. See  id. at 705 (“The defendants, however, insist that the statute requires something 
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the Sixth Circuit found that when actual damages are an alternative  
form of recovery, there is an implication that a statutory violation alone 
is sufficient to establish liability.94 
Regarding the two-prong analysis, Beaudry alleged that she was 
among the injured.95 Therefore, she claimed that TeleCheck failed to 
follow “reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” 
regarding her information.96 The Sixth Circuit held that FCRA’s 
statutory damages provision aims to protect against individual, rather 
than collective, harm.97 When the plaintiff is “among the injured” and 
the statutory right protects against individual harm, the “nexus . . . 
sustain[s] this statutorily created right.98 
In contrast to the relatively substantial treatment given to this 
question by the Beaudry court, the Seventh Circuit considered it settled 
that a claim for statutory damages was sufficient for standing.99  In 
Murray v. GMAC Mortgage Corp.,100 Nancy Murray, the plaintiff 
representing a potential class of more than one million, sued a mortgage 
company for allegedly violating two FCRA provisions without causing 
her any additional harm.101   The Seventh Circuit noted that requiring 
 
more—that Beaudry allege a different form of injury . . . .”). 
94. See id. at 705–06 (“Because ‘actual damages’ represent an alternative form of  
relief and because the statute permits a recovery when there are no identifiable or 
measurable actual damages, this subsection implies that a claimant need not suffer (or 
allege) consequential damages to file a claim.”) (emphasis added). 
95. See id. at 707 (“Beaudry alleged that she was one of the consumers about whom  
the defendants were generating credit card reports based on inaccurate information due to 
their failure to update their databases. . . .”). 
96. Id. 
97. See id. (“[I]t creates an individual right not to have unlawful practices occur ‘with 
respect to’ one’s own credit information.”). 
98.    Id. at 704. 
99. See Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 952–53 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(disagreeing with the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs should have sought 
compensatory damages instead of the FCRA’s statutory damages remedy). 
100.    434 F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 2006). 
101. See id. at 950–51 (“Murray filed suit, proposing to represent a class of about 1.2 
million recipients of similar offers from GMACM and demanding statutory damages, which 
range from $100 to $1,000 per person.”). Murray  alleged that the mortgage company’s  
offer did not contain “a ‘clear and conspicuous’ notice of the recipient’s right to close her 
credit information to all who lacked prior consent,” and that “GMACM had not made the 
‘firm offer of credit’ that is essential when a potential lender accesses someone’s credit 
history without that person’s consent.”  See id. at 951; Fair Credit Reporting Act § 604, 15 
U.S.C. § 1681b(c)(1)(B)(i) (2015) (“A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer 
report relating to any consumer . . . in connection with any credit or insurance transaction 
that is not initiated by the consumer only if . . . the transaction consists of a firm offer of 
credit . . . .”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(d)(1)(D) (“Any person who uses a consumer 
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plaintiffs not to use the statutory damages remedy would make class 
actions “impossible.”102 Individual losses are often small or hard to 
calculate, so litigating consumer class actions when each plaintiff’s 
damages need to be determined to come up with a compensatory 
damages amount makes class actions infeasible.103 Finally, the Seventh 
Circuit asserted that this is why some statutes, like FCRA, allow 
plaintiffs modest damages without the need to prove injury.104 
The Ninth Circuit found that Robins was in the same position as 
the plaintiff in Beaudry.105 Robins alleged that his statutory rights were 
violated and the “interests protected by the statutory rights at issue are 
sufficiently concrete and particularized that Congress can elevate 
them.”106 The Ninth Circuit drew a comparison to the types of injuries 
explicitly mentioned in Lujan as examples of those that can be elevated 
by Congress, likening Robins’s personal interest in the handling of his 
credit card information to a person’s interest in living in a racially 
integrated community.107 In a footnote, the  majority  noted  that 
“[b]ecause we determine that Robins has standing by virtue of the 
alleged violations of his statutory rights, we do not decide whether harm 
to his employment prospects or related anxiety could be sufficient 
injuries in fact.”108 
 
C. The Supreme Court Reverses and Remands 
 
Spokeo  petitioned  the  Supreme  Court  for  certiorari.109    The 
 
report on any consumer in connection with any credit or insurance transaction . . . shall 
provide . . . a clear and conspicuous statement that . . . the consumer has a right to prohibit 
information contained in the consumer’s file . . . from being used in connection with any 
credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer.”). 
102. Murray, 434 F.3d at 952. 
103. See id. at 953 (“Common questions no longer would predominate, and an effort to 
determine a million consumers’ individual losses would make the suit unmanageable.”). 
104. Id. 
105. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 
1540 (2016). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)). In Lujan, the 
Supreme Court mentions an individual’s personal interest in living in a racially integrated 
community and a company’s interest in marketing its product free from competition as those 
which can be elevated by Congress. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578. 
108.    Robins, 742 F.3d at 414 n.3. 
109. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016) (“We therefore vacate the 
decision below . . . .”). 
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Supreme Court’s majority opinion rejected the Ninth Circuit’s  
reasoning that Congress elevated a statutory right, which includes injury 
in fact, to a legally cognizable right as an alternative to  the 
constitutional minimum for standing.110 For an injury to be 
particularized, it “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual 
way.”111 The majority then noted that an injury in fact must also be 
“concrete” and alleged that the Ninth Circuit failed to consider these 
two distinct ideas in its standing analysis.112 In the majority’s view, the 
Ninth Circuit only considered factors relating to particularization, 
making it a constitutionally inadequate standing analysis.113 
The majority referred to the two factors for injury elevation the 
Ninth Circuit adopted from the Sixth Circuit in Beaudry.114 In the 
majority’s view, the two Beaudry factors both applied to 
particularization.115 The Supreme Court majority’s opinion talked past 
the Ninth Circuit by insisting that it conducted the traditional, three- 
pronged standing test  incorrectly.116  Actually,  the  Ninth  Circuit 
declined to apply the traditional test at all.117 The majority continued 
with  a  one  paragraph  explanation  of  concreteness,  pointing  to  the 
 
 
 
110. See id. at 1547–48 (“[I]t is settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing 
requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise 
have standing.”). 
111.    Id. at 1548. 
112. Id. at 1548. The Ninth Circuit would likely agree and with good reason. As 
referenced in footnote 3 in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, the court believed it was unnecessary 
to consider Article III standing fully in that case. Robins, 742 F.3d at 414 n.3. 
113. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (“Under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, [the 
concreteness] requirement was elided.”); see also Robins, 742 F.3d at 414 n.3 (noting that a 
full discussion of the requirements for injury in fact would be legally superfluous). 
114. Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548; see also Robins, 742 F.3d at 413 (adopting the two 
factors for statutory right elevation from Beaudry). 
115. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (“Both of these observations concern 
particularization, not concreteness.”). But see Robins, 742 F.3d at 413–14 (“[A]lleged 
violations of Robins’s statutory rights are sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement 
of Article III.”). 
116. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (“Both of these observations concern 
particularization, not concreteness.”). But see Robins, 742 F.3d at 413–14 (“[A]lleged 
violations of Robins’s statutory rights are sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement 
of Article III.”). 
117. See Robins, 742 F.3d at 414 n.3 (“Because we determine that Robins has standing 
by virtue of the alleged violation of his statutory rights, we do not decide whether harm to 
his employment prospects or related anxiety could be sufficient injuries in fact.”). The  
Ninth Circuit thought that precedent dictated that there was no need to go through the full 
standing test, because of this alternate route created for cases like Beaudry. Id. 
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Black’s Law Dictionary definition.118 “A ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de 
facto’; that is, it must actually exist.”119 The majority asserted that 
concrete means “real” in the sense that it is not “abstract.”120 
The majority agreed that Congress may “elevate to the status of 
legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were 
previously inadequate in law.121 The majority distinguishes its opinion 
from the Ninth Circuit by holding that even in the case of an elevated 
statutory violation Article III requires a concrete injury in fact.122 The 
majority added that the risk of real harm can satisfy the concreteness 
requirement.123 “In other words, a plaintiff in such a case need not  
allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.”124 
Seemingly out of nowhere, the majority then reached the conclusion 
that, in this case, Robins cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by 
alleging a “bare procedural violation,” because a “violation of one of 
FCRA’s procedural requirements may result in no harm.”125 For 
example, the majority opinion suggested a consumer report containing 
only an incorrect zip code would conceivably violate the statute, but it is 
difficult to imagine how that alone would work any harm.126 
 
IV. SPOKEO AND PRIOR PRECEDENT 
 
In a concurring opinion in Spokeo, Justice Thomas essentially 
endorsed what the Ninth Circuit did, at least with regard to Robins’s 
claim that Spokeo did not follow reasonable procedures to assure 
maximum possible accuracy.127  Justice Thomas would have the Ninth 
 
118. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 1549 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)). 
122. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (“Article III standing requires a concrete injury 
even in the context of a statutory violation.”). 
123. See id. (“This does not mean, however, that the risk of real harm cannot satisfy the 
requirement of concreteness.”). 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. See id. at 1553–54 (Thomas, J., concurring) (acknowledging the Warth principle 
and noting that one of Robins’ claims “rests on a statutory provision that could arguably 
establish a private cause of action to vindicate the violation of a privately held right); see 
also Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413–14 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1540 
(2016) (“[A]lleged violations of Robins’s statutory rights are sufficient to satisfy the injury- 
in-fact requirement of Article III.”). 
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Circuit consider whether Robins is trying to enforce a public or 
individual right.128 The difference between the majority and concurring 
opinions arises out of the majority’s misapplication of Lujan.129 
Justice Thomas appreciated the limitations of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lujan.130 The majority opinion used an overbroad 
conception of Lujan, ignoring its limited holding that the concreteness 
requirement must remain in suits against the government.131 The 
plaintiffs in Lujan relied on a statute that authorized anyone to bring a 
lawsuit based on the government’s failure to follow a correct 
procedure.132 The majority rejected this justification for Article III 
standing and viewed the challenge as a case where a private citizen sues 
to force the government to act properly.133 The majority affirmed the 
idea that “the injury required by Article III may exist solely by virtue of 
‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates 
standing.’”134 The question, whether this statute creates such a legal 
right, is the question the Supreme Court majority should have either 
 
 
 
128. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1553–54 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that 
Robins can have standing to sue by alleging the invasion of a legal right, if FCRA imposes a 
duty upon Spokeo to Robins individually, as opposed to the public). 
129. See id. at 1549 (“Robins could not . . . allege a bare procedural violation, divorced 
from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.”). But see 
id. at 1553 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“A plaintiff seeking to vindicate a public right 
embodied in a federal statute, however, must demonstrate that the violation of that public 
right has caused him a concrete, individual harm distinct from the general population.”). 
130. See id. at 1553 (Thomas, J., concurring) (acknowledging the language in Lujan that 
limits the holding to suits against the government); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (“Whether or not the principle set forth in Warth can be extended 
beyond that distinction, it is clear that in suits against the government, the concrete injury 
requirement must remain.”). 
131. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (suggesting that Lujan means a concrete injury 
is always necessary in the case of a statutory violation); but see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (“[I]t 
is clear that in suits against the Government . . . the concrete injury requirement must 
remain.”). 
132. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 (“The [Circuit Court] held that, because § 7(a)(2) 
requires interagency consultation, the citizen-suit provision creates a ‘procedural righ[t]’ to 
consultation in all ‘persons’ – so that anyone can file suit in federal court to challenge the 
Secretary’s (or presumably any other federal official’s) failure to follow the assertedly 
correct . . . procedure, notwithstanding his or her inability to allege any discrete injury 
flowing from the failure.”). 
133. See id. at 573–74 (“We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a 
generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every 
citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws . . . does not state an 
Article III case or controversy.”). 
134.    Id. at 578 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)). 
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answered or asked the Ninth Circuit to answer.135 The Ninth Circuit did 
answer that question in the affirmative.136 
Even treating the majority’s application of Lujan and other 
precedent as correct,137 it is unclear what the majority wanted Robins to 
allege.138 The majority suggests that Robins should have alleged a risk  
of harm coming from these statutory violations, but, more than that, 
Robins alleged real, existing harm instead.139  The dissent agreed that  
the majority overlooked the concrete injury Robins alleged.140 There is 
no need to remand the case when, even on an incorrect legal theory, 
Robins meets the demands of the majority.141 In addition to the  
concerns raised by Justice Ginsburg in the dissent, it is difficult to 
discern just what the Court meant by “real.”142 The majority did not 
mean that the injury is tangible.143 In fact, the opinion discussed how 
intangible harms can still be concrete.144 Congress can make certain 
statutory violations into constructive “real” injuries.145 At some level,  
the majority opinion in Spokeo recognized that Congress can elevate 
 
 
135. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1554 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“On remand, the Ninth Circuit can consider the nature of this claim.”). 
136. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 742 F.3d 409, 413–14 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. 
Ct. 1540 (2016) (“[A]lleged violations of Robins’s statutory rights are sufficient to satisfy 
the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.”). 
137. See discussion infra PART IV (arguing that the Spokeo majority opinion misapplied 
Lujan.). 
138. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1550 (“[The Ninth Circuit’s standing analysis] did 
not address the question framed by our discussion, namely, whether the particular 
procedural violations alleged in this case entail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the 
concreteness requirement.”). 
139. See id. (“[The Ninth Circuit’s standing analysis] did not address the question 
framed by our discussion, namely, whether the particular procedural violations alleged in 
this case entail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement.”). But see  
id. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (noting that Robins alleges the misinformation on 
Spokeo’s website is causing imminent and ongoing harm). 
140. See id. at 1556 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I therefore see no utility in returning this 
case to the Ninth Circuit to underscore what Robins’ complaint already conveys concretely: 
Spokeo’s misinformation ‘cause[s] actual harm to [his] employment prospects.”). 
141. See id. (“I therefore see no utility in returning this case to the Ninth Circuit to 
underscore what Robins’ complaint already conveys concretely: Spokeo’s misinformation 
‘cause[s] actual harm to [his] employment prospects.’”). 
142. See id. at 1548 (“When we have used the adjective ‘concrete,’ we have meant to 
convey the usual meaning of the term— ‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’”). 
143. See id. at 1549 (“‘Concrete’ is not, however, necessarily synonymous with 
‘tangible.’”). 
144. See id. 
145. See id. (discussing Congress’ role in identifying and and elevating intangible 
harms). 
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intangible harm to constructively meet the concreteness requirement.146 
Acknowledging that Congress can do so, yet still requiring an additional 
concrete injury, outside of the context of lawsuits against the 
government,147 is antithetical to the precedent from various federal 
circuits.148 
 
V. SPOKEO BENEFITS CONSUMERS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
Spokeo has significant implications for prospective lawsuits 
under consumer financial protection statutes.149 To some extent, both 
consumer advocacy groups and groups representing the interests of 
financial institutions view the Spokeo decision favorably.150 Perhaps 
indicating some level of uncertainty over the long-term impact of 
Spokeo, both sides of the issue are attempting to spin the decision for 
their respective benefits.151 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”) has been aggressively submitting amicus briefs that 
incorporate Spokeo since it was decided in early 2016.152  The strategy 
 
146. See id. (discussing Congress’ role in identifying and and elevating intangible 
harms). 
147. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (holding that the 
injury in fact requirement must remain in suits against the government). 
148. See Beaudry v. TeleCheck Servs., Inc., 579 F.3d 702, 705–07 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that the FCRA allows for recovery when there are no measurable damages); see 
also Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 2006) (“That actual loss is 
small and hard to quantify is why statutes such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act provide for 
modest damages without proof of injury.”). 
149. See discussion supra PART IV (arguing that Spokeo makes it more difficult for 
consumers to successfully bring class action suits); see also David J. Lender, Greg Silbert, 
Eric S. Hochstadt, & Gaspard Curioni, Supreme Court Reiterates Concrete Injury 
Requirement in Consumer Class Action Statutory Damages Case, 28 NO. 7 INTELL. PROP. & 
TECH. L.J. 20, 21 (July, 2016) (pointing to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act as one 
consumer financial protection statute that will be affected). 
150. See Lee v. Verizon Comm., Inc., No. 14-10553, 2016 BL 302784, at *2 (5th Cir., 
Sept. 15, 2016) (holding that in light of Spokeo, the conclusion that “a plaintiff’s bare 
allegation of incursion on the purported statutory right to ‘proper plan management’ under 
ERISA is insufficient to meet the injury-in-fact prong of Article III standing.”); but see  
Brief for Department of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at *23, 
Fletcher v. Convergex Group, LLC, (No. 16-00734), (arguing that Spokeo comports with 
prior holdings that the violation of a statutory right to proper fiduciary conduct is sufficient 
for injury-in-fact). 
151. See Chris Bruce, Spokeo Test Plaintiff Has Standing, CFPB Says, 106 Banking rep. 
(BNA) No. 24. at 885 (June 13, 2016) (“The CFPB said Bock suffered ‘concrete harm 
sufficient to establish Article III standing.’”). 
152. See id. (“The CFPB said Bock suffered ‘concrete harm sufficient to  establish 
Article III standing,’ citing his allegations that Pressler & Pressler misrepresented ‘that an 
attorney was meaningfully involved’ in the suit against him.”).  In this case, a plaintiff is 
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for groups submitting briefs on behalf of consumers seems to be 
explicitly referring to the alleged harm as “concrete harm.”153 The 
arguments have not changed significantly; rather, the language used by 
plaintiffs and their supporters has changed. 
In at least one brief, the CFPB focused on the Spokeo majority’s 
usage of Akins.154 This case, Keen v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,155 was 
about a disclosure regarding a finance charge under TILA that 
JPMorgan allegedly failed to make.156 In cases where the alleged 
statutory violation results from plaintiffs not receiving some  
information to which they are entitled, the CFPB argues that Spokeo 
supports standing for those plaintiffs.157 In the Keen brief, the CFPB  
also argues that the plaintiffs have standing whether or not a finance 
charge is actually assessed.158 This is where the CFPB goes furthest to 
limit Spokeo’s impact by asserting the Akins principal that no additional 
harm needs to be alleged.159 
The National Consumer Law Center (“NCLC”) is 
recommending that plaintiffs plead actual damages, rather than only 
statutory damages, when possible.160   Additionally, as Spokeo is only 
 
suing a law firm under the FDCPA, because the FDCPA gives consumers a legal right to 
truthful information in their dealings with debt collectors. Id. 
153. See id. (“The CFPB said Bock suffered ‘concrete harm sufficient to  establish 
Article III standing.’”). 
154. See Brief for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at *11, Keen v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, (No. 15-17188), (“In 
particular, Spokeo specifically reaffirms that plaintiffs in certain cases ‘need not allege any 
additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified’—-and it identifies Akins and  
Public Citizen as cases in which no additional harm was required.”). 
155. Keen v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 15-cv-01806-WHO, 2015 WL 6601775 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 30, 2015). 
156. See Brief for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at *10, Keen v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, (No. 15-17188) 
(citing Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1683(a)(3) (2015)) (“TILA grants consumers a 
right to receive an accurate disclosure of ‘the finance charge’ associated with their loan.”). 
157. See id. at *8 (“[T]he alleged invasion of the Borrowers’ legally protected interest in 
receiving information that accurately describes the finance charge that they were legally 
obligated to pay is a sufficiently concrete injury-in-fact. And, as Spokeo reaffirms, that  
injury is enough by itself to satisfy Article III even if the borrowers did not suffer any 
additional injury beyond the deprivation of information . . . .”). 
158.    Id. at *11. 
159. See id. (“Spokeo specifically reaffirms that plaintiffs in certain cases ‘need not 
allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.”). 
160. LEGAL TREATISES, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, STATUTE-SPECIFIC SPOKEO 
ANALYSES EXCERPTED FROM UPDATED NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER  LEGAL 
TREATISES: STANDING, http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/litigation/spokeo/Truth-in-Lending- 
11-2.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2017). 
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binding on federal courts, the NCLC recommends considering bringing 
suit in state court where Spokeo is not controlling, but only 
persuasive.161 Additionally, the NCLC reads Spokeo narrowly and 
suggests that pleading a material risk of real harm may be enough to 
have standing under Spokeo.162 
At least one district court has limited Spokeo’s impact to apply 
only when the statutory violation is extremely unlikely to cause any 
actual harm.163 In Larson v. Trans Union, LLC,164 the court  asked 
whether it was conceivable for the statutory violation complained of to 
cause some harm, even just emotional distress.165 This reading  of 
Spokeo places emphasis on the majority’s point that an incorrect zip 
code would be a technical violation of the FCRA.166 In Larson, the 
plaintiff alleged that Trans Union provided a credit report with 
misleading information; specifically, the credit report did not make it 
clear that the plaintiff was not on a terrorist watch list.167 The United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California decided that 
a misleading designation regarding terrorist watch list status that 
allegedly caused emotional distress is different from a bare procedural 
violation perpetrated by the dissemination of an incorrect zip code.168 
The Larson court also asserted that some other districts have limited the 
restrictive impact Spokeo has on Article III standing.169 
 
 
161. See id. 
162. Id. 
163. See Larson v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 12-CV-05726-WHO, 2016 BL 260668, at *3 
(N.D. Cal., Aug. 11, 2016) (noting that “the [Supreme Court] ‘expressed no view about any 
other types of false information’ and ‘took no position as to whether the Ninth Circuit’s 
ultimate conclusion . . . was correct.”). 
164.   No. 12-CV-05726-WHO, 2016 BL 260668 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 11, 2016). 
165. See id. (“[I]t is not ‘difficult to imagine how the dissemination of [the OFAC 
disclosure] could work [some] concrete harm’ to consumers.”). 
166. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (noting that the mere 
inaccurate reporting of a zip code is unlikely to work any harm). 
167. See Larson, No. 12-CV-05726-WHO, 2016 BL 260668, at *3. In Larson the 
plaintiff alleged that Trans Union provided a “misleading” credit report. See id. It was 
misleading as to whether the plaintiff was a possible Office of Foreign Asset Control match. 
See id. 
168. Id. 
169. See id. (“[H]is claim is based on the sort of ‘informational’ injury that the Spokeo 
court implicitly recognized . . . and that a number of other cases . . . have found sufficient to 
support Article III standing.”). The Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff had standing under 
FDCPA when the plaintiff was entitled to receive certain disclosures and  the defendant 
failed to make them.  Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., No. 15-15708, 2016 WL 3611543, at 
*2–3, (11 Cir., July 6, 2016).  The Northern District Court in Illinois held that a plaintiff had 
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While  consumer  advocacy  groups  and  some  district  courts 
might want to limit the impact of Spokeo’s holding, it is clear that it 
presents a sizable obstacle for consumer litigation, specifically class 
actions.170 Financial institutions will surely use Spokeo to challenge 
consumer class actions at the early stages of litigation.171 The Spokeo 
decision unequivocally deprives consumers of the ability to bring suits 
against covered entities while alleging only statutory damages without 
additional concrete injury.172 Regardless of what else comes from the 
opinion, it is clear that alleging a plain statutory violation is not enough 
to establish standing.173 Though the CFPB is trying to emphasize 
Spokeo’s mention of Akins, Spokeo’s majority opinion makes it clear 
that notwithstanding cases like Akins, “Robins cannot satisfy the 
demands of Article III by alleging a bare procedural violation.”174 Since 
Article III standing is now more difficult to allege, fewer lawsuits under 
consumer financial protection will be initiated.175 In the suits that are 
brought, financial institutions will have a more powerful tool at their 
disposal: a strengthened case for dismissal for want of standing  to 
sue.176 
Consumer class actions are burdensome to financial institutions, 
which are forced to choose between two unfavorable positions: Settle a 
suit the financial institution might otherwise win or litigate it and risk 
taking a serious loss.177  For example, Bank of America spent $6 billion 
 
standing under FDCPA because the plaintiff established a concrete injury in that the 
defendant provided a misleading debt collection notice, which denied the plaintiff the right 
to information due to him. Lane v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 15-CV-10446, 2016 
WL 3671467, at *3–5 (N.D. Ill., July 11, 2016). 
170. See Lender, et. al., supra note 146 (“[T]he Court reaffirmed well-settled doctrine 
against efforts by plaintiffs’ counsel to short-circuit the constitutional standing analysis in 
actions dealing with statutorily created rights.”). 
171. See Lender, et. al., supra note 146. 
172. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Article III standing 
requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”). 
173. See id. 
174.    Id. at 1550. 
175. See NOAH A. LEVINE, DAVID LESSER, JAMIE DYCUS, & FIONA J. KAYE, SUPREME 
COURT VACATES NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN SPOKEO,  REMANDS  FOR  ANALYSIS  OF 
CONCRETE HARMS, WILMERHALE, (2016) (“Spokeo is likely to curtail significantly  the 
ability of plaintiffs to pursue class actions for mere procedural or other ‘technical’ violations 
under such [consumer financial protection statutes].”). 
176. See id. 
177. Scott S. Partridge & Kerry J. Miller, Some Practical Considerations for Defending 
and Settling Products Liability and Consumer Class Actions, 74 TUL. L. REV. 2125, 2162 
(June, 2000) (“Plaintiff class action lawyers have always been very creative in seeking to 
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in the first quarter of 2014 on litigation, which includes suits that were 
settled.178  Bankers admit that high legal bills can obscure the bottom  
line when the bank is doing very well.179  In contrast, a reduction in  
legal fees can dramatically improve the bottom line: Citigroup’s 
expenses decreased by $5 billion in 2014, largely as a result of lower 
legal expenses.180 Without the legal expenditures, banks like Bank of 
America can transfer profits down to consumers by paying higher 
dividends, increasing deposit interest rates, or decreasing interest on 
loans, for example. 
When financial institutions spend less money defending 
consumer lawsuits, their bottom lines, and, consequently, consumers 
benefit.181 With the excess capital, those institutions can make new 
investments. If those investments return additional capital, banks can 
make even more investments. Furthermore, banks can use the capital to 
improve their services and branch facilities for  consumers.  As  the 
world modernizes, banks would do well to keep pace with regard to 
technology and quality of user interface.182 Consumers benefit from 
technological improvements that make financial activity more  
accessible and more aesthetically interesting. Besides internal investing 
to improve the consumer experience, the amount of litigation-related 
expenses incurred can affect whether a holding company disburses 
dividends  to  its  shareholders  and  how  large  those  dividends  are.183 
 
place consumer products companies in a ‘catch-22’ of ‘settling to survive’ or ‘betting the 
company’ by litigating.”). 
178. Polly Mosendz, Here’s How Much America’s Biggest Banks Spent on Legal Bills 
This Quarter, THE ATLANTIC (April 17, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/ 
2014/04/heres-how-much-americas-biggest-banks-spent-on-legal-bills-this-quarter/360773/. 
179. Id. (quoting Bank of America CEO Bruce Thompson as claiming the bank would 
have turned a nice profit without the high legal bills); see Donal Griffin and Dakin 
Campbell, U.S. Bank Legal Bills Exceed $100 Billion, BLOOMBERG, (Aug. 28, 2013, 12:02 
PM) (“The sum, equivalent to spending $51 million a day, is enough to erase everything the 
banks earned in 2012.”). 
180. See Christina Rexrode & Peter Rudegeair, Citigroup Profit Soars on Lower 
Litigation Costs, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/citigroup-profit- 
soars-on-lower-litigation-costs-1437048055  (“Expenses  fell  30%  to  $10.93  billion  from 
$15.52 billion a year earlier, largely because of smaller legal costs.”). 
181. See Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp., All Institutions Performance Fourth Quarter 2015, FDIC 
QUARTERLY BANKING PROFILE (2015) (“Declines in expenses for litigation at a few large 
banks . . . lift fourth-quarter income at FDIC-insured institutions. . . .”). 
182. Penny Crosman, Why the Retail Store Bank Branch is Making a Comeback, BANK 
SYS. & TECH., (Mar. 23, 2011) http://www.banktech.com/channels/why-the-retail-store- 
bank-branch-is-making-a-comeback/d/d-id/1294594?. 
183. Cf. Beverly Hirtle, Bank Holding Company Dividends and Repurchases During the 
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Holding companies with extra capital due to lower litigation expenses 
may pay dividends to their shareholders, which benefits those 
consumers. Since Spokeo presents a greater barrier to consumers’ 
lawsuit prospects, financial institutions can expect a positive impact on 
their bottom lines resulting from decreased litigation expenses.184 
 
VI. A NEW, COMMON SENSE TEST FOR STANDING IN STATUTORY 
VIOLATION CASES 
 
There is significant disagreement among federal courts  
regarding when Congress can elevate statutory violations to the status of 
concrete injuries.185 There is disagreement over whether any additional 
injury needs to be alleged if Congress satisfactorily elevates a statutory 
violation.186 The Supreme Court should seek to provide an answer for 
these disagreements as well as solutions for the other problems left 
unsolved in Spokeo. Standing doctrine is frequently criticized as 
confusing, “manipulable,” and a cover for improper analysis.187  There  
is empirical evidence that in cases with substantially similar facts, the 
standing doctrine was applied in opposite ways.188 For a doctrine with 
such dispositive power, that is unacceptable. 
In cases of statutory violations under consumer financial 
protection statutes, federal courts should apply a test of basic reason. 
The majority opinion in Spokeo focused on the idea that it was possible 
to violate the FCRA without working any concrete harm.189 Why is that 
relevant to Robins’s case? Robins presented the various inaccuracies 
contained in the report.190 Robins then explained  why  those 
inaccuracies  made  him  less  attractive  to  employers  while  he  was 
 
Financial Crisis, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N. Y. STAFF REPORTS NO. 666, at 1 (March 2014) 
(supporting the notion that dividends and other capital distributions are inappropriate and 
unlikely when capital comes under stress). 
184. See Lender, et. al., supra note 146 (“Post-Spokeo companies facing such putative 
class actions can be expected to challenge vigorously a named plaintiff’s standing at the 
pleading stage.”). 
185. See discussion supra PART III. 
186. See discussion supra PART III. 
187. Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 467 (2008). 
188. Id. 
189. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (“[N]ot all inaccuracies 
cause harm or present any material risk of harm.”). 
190. See id. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (listing the inaccuracies including an 
inaccurate picture, inaccurate age, income level, education level, etc.). 
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actively seeking employment.191 It is unfair to ask Robins to obtain  
some kind of proof that an employer chose not to pursue him as a result 
of the inaccuracies. It is impractical to look for that kind  of  
information. A fact-specific test would be a proper replacement for a  
test that speculates whether it is possible to violate the statute without 
causing harm. The Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Spokeo 
emphasized that it was possible to violate FCRA without doing actual 
harm.192 Instead, the new test asks whether the actual facts pled point to 
the injury complained of. 
It is better for financial institutions and consumers if consumers 
cannot sustain lawsuits on bare statutory violations alone.193 Standing 
based only on statutory violations opens the door to  frivolous 
lawsuits.194 The Court should articulate a new test, which amounts to: 
Does the story make sense, or more specifically, is the plaintiff alleging 
a bare statutory violation? If the answer is yes, does that statutory 
violation come paired with a provision for statutory damages? If the 
answer is yes, is the plaintiff alleging some harm? If the answer is yes, 
does it make sense that this particular statutory violation results in the 
harm the plaintiff sustained? This suggested test does not preclude 
judicial discretion. It asks the judge to determine if the story  is  
coherent. It is important to ask the question in the context  of the 
specific facts alleged by the plaintiff. So, instead of wondering whether 
it is possible to violate the statute without working any real harm, like 
the Spokeo majority insisted on doing,195 ask if the way the statute was 
allegedly violated could harm the plaintiff in the way the plaintiff 
alleges. 
This  test  still  avoids  the  pitfalls  about  which  the  Spokeo 
majority was concerned.196   A plaintiff alleging an incorrect zip code 
 
191. See id. (“As Robins elaborated on brief, Spokeo’s report made him appear 
overqualified for jobs he might have gained, expectant of a higher salary than employers 
would be willing to pay, and less mobile because of family responsibilities.”). 
192. See id. at 1550 (“A violation of one of FCRA’s procedural requirements may result 
in no harm.”). 
193. See discussion supra PART V. 
194. See Lender, et. al., supra note 146 (“The ruling effectively puts to rest the 
contention that the availability of statutory damages from an alleged technical violation is  
by itself sufficient to confer standing.”). 
195. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1550 (“It is difficult to imagine how the 
dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without more, could work any concrete harm.”). 
196. See id. (“It is difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code, 
without more, could work any concrete harm.”). 
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was reported would not have standing, but Robins clearly would.197 
Robins alleged a statutory violation, namely that Spokeo did not use 
reasonable efforts to ensure the accuracy of the information reported 
about Robins. Robins alleged some harm; specifically, he asserted that 
the inaccurate reporting may have deprived him of employment 
opportunities. Finally, the story, supported by the available facts, is 
coherent and reasonable. The employers Robins would be interested in 
may not have been interested in him because of misconceptions created 
by the inaccurate credit report. 
The proposed test does not conflict with anything in Lujan, but  
it is better to articulate a clear, bright line than to revert to Lujan. 
Lujan’s narrow holding was that in suits against the government, the 
concrete injury requirement must remain.198 Lujan reaffirmed the 
principle that, outside of suits against the government, “the injury 
required by Article III may exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating 
rights, the invasion of which creates standing.’”199 The proposed test’s 
most significant advantage is that it does away with the  imprecise 
notion of concreteness with which Lujan does not dispense. As an 
alternative to the traditional standing test, a federal court should find  
that a plaintiff, or class of plaintiffs, has standing if they allege (1) a 
statutory violation, (2) that that statutory violation is paired with a civil 
liability provision, (3) that they have suffered any harm, and (4) that the 
alleged violation caused that harm. This test is consistent with the 
principle affirmed in Lujan, that Congress can elevate certain otherwise 
insufficient injuries to the status of concrete injuries.200 The test builds 
upon Lujan by asking the right questions to determine whether  
Congress conveyed standing in the case of any particular plaintiff. 
The new test would inject some clarity into a contentious area of 
law, even though Robins would have standing under the proposed test. 
Consumers  benefit  from  clarity  because  it  allows  them  to  assess 
 
 
197. See id. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting the statutory provision Spokeo 
allegedly violated, the inaccuracies Spokeo allegedly published, and the harm that allegedly 
resulted). 
198. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (“[I]t is clear that in 
suits against the Government, at least, the concrete injury requirement must remain.”). 
199. Id. 
200. See id. (“Nothing in this contradicts the principle that ‘[t]he . . . injury required by 
Article III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which 
creates standing.’” 
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whether bringing a lawsuit is worthwhile. Financial institutions benefit 
from clarity, because clarity helps them to conform their behavior to the 
law in the course of regular operations. Financial institutions seeking to 
avoid lawsuits are better able to do so when they can be sure of what it 
takes for a plaintiff to have standing. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Standing is a fundamental doctrine; it is a basic constitutional 
requirement, emerging from the Constitution’s “cases and 
controversies” language, without which a piece of litigation cannot 
proceed. Article III standing challenges are a powerful tool for those 
litigants who can make use of them. The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Spokeo diminishes the ability of consumers to bring lawsuits under 
consumer financial protection statutes by depriving consumers of their 
standing when they can only allege bare statutory violations without a 
concrete injury. As long as Spokeo governs, financial institutions stand 
to benefit. 
While this Note contends that the Supreme Court misapplied the 
relevant precedent in Spokeo, the Court had the correct policy concerns 
in mind. A new, clear test that circumvents discussions of concreteness 
in the context of statutory violations would allow federal courts to throw 
out frivolous lawsuits while allowing suits where harm from the 
statutory violation is difficult to show concretely at the pleading stage. 
The clarity benefits both financial institutions and consumers. 
Consumers, like Robins, can maintain their suits, while consumers also 
benefit indirectly from a reduction in legal fees paid by financial 
institutions. Financial institutions benefit primarily through a reduction 
in legal fees resulting from fewer frivolous consumer lawsuits. The 
proposed test balances the best interests of both consumers and financial 
institutions and injects clarity into the crucial, but often misapplied 
Article III standing doctrine. 
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